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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2 ) (i ) , stating
that the Court of Appeals has appellant jurisdiction over
appeals

from

the

District

Court

involving

domestic

relations cases, including but not limited to divorce and
property division.

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellant

Procedure also indicates a procedure for taking appeals
from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts.

This Brief

follows the structural requirements outlined in Rule 24
of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure.
appeal

by

Janeane

B.

Delker,

This is an

Plaintiff,

from

an

Objection to a post divorce order on pre-trial.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the relief sought by appellant is barred
by res judicata.
2.

Whether an order which was set aside on the

basis that notice of hearing was defective applies to all
or part of the issues addressed in that order.
3.

Whether section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code was

improperly applied.
4.

Whether Appellee is entitled to attorneys fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

The
Appellant

standard
Court

of
must

Review
reverse

on

Appeal
only

if

is

that

there

is

the
a

misapplication or misunderstanding of the law, if the
1

evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or
conclusions or if there is a serious inequity that must
be rectified.

That is English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,

410 (Utah 1977) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Objection to a
divorce

Order

on

Pre-Trial

brought

by

post

Appellant's

(hereinafter referred to "Janeane") Petition to Modify,
heard by Commissioner Maurice Richards and entered by the
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second District Court
of Weber County on February 14, 1992.l

R., page 239

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
After oral argument and proffers by
counsels

and

after

receiving

respective

exhibits, Judge

Taylor

upheld Commissioner Richard's Pre-Trial Order, finding
that

there

had

been

no

substantial

change

in

circumstances to increase child support and that there
was no substantial change of circumstances or other basis
to make the child support retroactive. R., pages 247-249
(Order

to

Modify

Decree

of

Divorce

and

Subsequent

All references are to the pages of the original record as
paginated by the Clerk of the District Court, pursuant to Utah
Rules of Appellant Procedure, Rule 25(e).
All documents in the
record referred to will be found in the Appendix in chronological
order. For purpose of clarity, the following abbreviations shall
be adopted by Appellee:
R. refers to the record with its page number and title of the
document in parenthesis.
T. transcript.

Orders).

The

Court

further

ordered

that

Appellee

(hereinafter referred to as "Leon") continue to pay child
support based upon his agreement with Janeane in August
of 1990. R., page 248 (Order to Modify Decree of Divorce
and Subsequent Orders).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties herein were divorced through a Decree
issued by the State of North Dakota in 1986.
(Order).

R., page 7

The North Dakota Court did not issue a decision

regarding child support or custody of the parties' minor
children, but declined to exercise jurisdiction to make
these determinations, finding that the State of Utah was
a more appropriate forum.

R., page 7 (Order).

Janeane

filed a Petition to establish child support and custody
of the three (3) minor children in the Second District
Court of Weber County pursuant to the Order of the North
Dakota

Court.

Leon

received

notice

of

a

hearing

scheduled on Janeane's Petition for September 9, 1986,
but, in fact, that hearing was held on September 8, 1986.
(this order will hereinafter be referred to as the "1986
hearing/order").

R., page 20 (Judgment in Petition for

Award of Custody Under UCCJA).

That Order required Leon

to pay Janeane child support in the amount of $116.00 per
month per child.

R., page 21 (Judgment in Petition for

Award of Custody Under UCCJA).
Leon

subsequently

made

a Motion

to Vacate

Judgment, which was heard on June 3, 1988.

that

The Domestic

Relations Commissioner held that Janeane's notice to Leon
for

the

hearing

to

determine

custody

of

the

minor

children was defective, in that it advised Leon that the
hearing was to be on September 9, 1986, when, in fact,
4

the matter was heard on September 8, 1986.

R., page 28

(Amended Order on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment).
The Court further reserved other issues to be decided at
pre-trial on August 8, 1988.
on

Defendant's

hearing

was

Motion

held

Commissioner

on

Maurice

R., page 29 (Amended Order

to Vacate
August

Judgment).

8,

Richards,

1988

in

wherein

Further
front

the

of

Court

addressed custody and also addressed child support to the
extent that they noted that child support would be abated
by one-half
Leon.

(1/2) during the summer visitations with

R., page 105 (Recommended Pre-Trial Order).
Child support had previously been set in 1981 by an

administrative

order

issued

through

the

Office

of

Recovery Services and which obligated Leon to pay child
support in the amount of

$75.00 per month per child.

This

to be changed

Order was

purported

at

the

1986

hearing, which increased the child support to $116.00 per
month per child.

R., page 21 (Judgment in Petition for

Award of Custody Under UCCJA).

As

explained above,

however, this Judgment was set aside due to the lack of
proper notice to Leon.

R., page 27-29 (Amended Order on

Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment).
Janeane filed a Petition to Modify seeking, among
other things, to increase child support, which Petition
was filed on March 20, 1990.

R., page 146

Petition for Modification or Judgment).
5

(Verified

Leon also filed

a Petition to Modify seeking custody of one (1) of the
minor children and an adjustment of child support.
Petition

was

(Verified

filed

August

Petition).

20, 1990.
Hearing

R.,

was

This

page

held

155

before

Commissioner Maurice Richards on August 24, 1990.

Child

support was discussed at that hearing and Commissioner
Richards specifically
increase in child
basis

that

circumstances.

found that the Petition

for an

support should be dismissed

on the

there
R.,

is
page

no

substantial

161

change

(Commissioner's

in

notes).

Janeane filed an Objection to that recommendation.

R.,

page 166 (Objection to Recommendations).
Notwithstanding the Commissioner's order that there
was no substantial change* in circumstances, the parties
voluntarily agreed that child support be increased from
$75.00 per month per child
child.

to $116.00 per month per

R., page 169 (Recommended Pre-Trial Order and

Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause).

Janeane's

objection was not heard until February 14, 1992 at which
point the Court held that the matter was res judicata and
that there was, in any event, no substantial change in
circumstances justifying an increase in child support.
R., page 247-249 (Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and
Subsequent Orders).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Janeane raises three (3) separate issues in support
of her contention that child support should be raised
retroactive to the initial administrative order of 1981
or in the alternative, that child support be based upon
the order entered in 1986, wherein Leon did not appear
due to improper notice.

Each of these arguments must

fail because the issue regarding the increase of child
support is res judicata.

It was found to be res judicata

by Commissioner Richards and that order was subsequently
upheld by Judge Taylor.
Janeane argues that the 1986 order does not set
aside

child

support, but

relative to custody.

only

sets

aside

the

order

This argument fails, both on the

basis that the matter is res judicata and on the basis
that the matter was set aside because of improper notice
to Leon.

The Court's entire order would be inapplicable

to Leon because the entire order would be set aside where
the underlying problem is improper notice to a party.
Finally, Janeane's argument that the Court erred in
applying

Section

78-45-7.2

of

the

Utah

Code

in

determining child support modification fails because the
Court specifically finds that whether it considers Leon's
actual change in income, or the change based upon the
guidelines, no substantial change occurred.

In other

words, the Court specifically found that even when this
7

statute is not considered, there was no substantial
change in circumstances.
Because the matter

is barred by res

Janeane's entire appeal must fail.

judicata,

If not, her appeal

must still fail on the basis that it was proper for the
Court to set aside the entire default order rather than
portion of it as argued by Janeane and because the Court
did not err in misapplying the statute regarding child
support.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT

1:

THE APPEAL MUST FAIL ON THE BASIS OF RES

JUDICATA.
The doctrine of res judicata actually has two (2)
branches, claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

Claim

preclusion bars the relitigation by the parties of a
claim for relief that was once litigated on the merits
and resulted in a final Judgment between the same parties
or

their

privies.

The

same

rule

also

prevents

relitigation of claims that could and should have been
litigated in a prior action, but were not.
Creation Cream, Inc., 669 P.2d

Penrod v. Nu

873, 874.

Collateral

estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation
of issues that have been once litigated and determined in
another action, even though the claims for relief in the
two (2) actions may be different.

Penrod at 875.

case

is

at

bar,

Janeane's

claim

barred

by

In the
claim

preclusion.
A.

JANEANE'S CLAIM COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN LITIGATED

BUT WERE NOT.
As indicated above, the general rule is that claim
preclusion bars relitigation of an action where that
claim could and should have been litigated but were not.
See also Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981).
In the case at bar, Janeane had at least three

(3)

chances to litigate the issue regarding retroactivity of
9

child support, but failed to do so.
The first chance occurred on September 8, 1986 in a
hearing before Judge John F. Wahlquist.

This is the same

hearing which was later set aside on the basis that Leon
did not have proper

notice.

Notwithstanding what later

occurred, the Court's order with regard to child support
simply provided as follows:
It is further ordered, adjudged and
decreed that $116.00 per month per
child paid by the Respondent to the
Petitioner and for child support.
The

only

other

provision

with

regard

to

child

support makes mandatory income withholding available.

A

copy of this order entitled Judgment in Petition for
Award

of

Custody

Under

UCCJA

is attached

hereto

as

Appendix "A".
If Janeane was seeking to have child

support be

retroactive to 1981 when the administrative order was
signed by Leon and which set child support at $75.00 per
month, she should have presented it at that time.

While

there is no transcript or findings upon which the Court
can determine whether the? issue was raised or not, it
should not matter.

If the issue was raised at that

hearing, it is clear that Judge Wahlquist ordered that
child support be increased to $116.00 per month from that
point forward.

If the issue of having child support

retroactive to 1981 was not raised, then it is barred on
the basis of claim preclusion because it should have been
10

raised.

If it was raised, then it is also barred on the

basis of claim preclusion because it had been litigated
at that point and the Court entered an order which does
not address retroactivity to 1981.
The second opportunity to raise the issue occurred
on June 3, 1988.

At that point, a hearing was held in

front of Commissioner Maurice Richards on Leon's Motion
to Vacate the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment in Petition for Award of Custody. Janeane could
have

argued

at

this

time

that

child

support

be

retroactive to 1981 or that the 1986 order which set
child support at $116.00 a month, be applied, at least as
to child support.
hearing

is

with

However, all that is ordered in this
regard

to

setting

temporary

summer

visitation and custody evaluations and reserves all other
matters to August 8, 1988.
The third opportunity that Janeane had to litigate
child support was at the hearing of August 8, 1988.

At

this point in time, it is clear that the Commissioner had
set aside the default order entered in September of 1986,
which

changed

the child

support

to $116.00 a month.

Notwithstanding this, it is also clear, based upon the
Recommended

Pre-Trial

Order,

that

child

support

was

discussed at least to the extent that child support would
be abated by one-half (1/2) during the summer visitation.
Janeane objected to the Commissioner's Recommended Order,
11

but limited her objections to the custody issue. Janeane
could

have

and

should

have

addressed

the

objections

regarding retroactivity of child support and the setting
aside of the child support order at the same time.
A fourth opportunity came for Janeane to address the
issues of child support.

This occurred on August 24,

1990.

Janeane

At

this

hearing,

did

object

to

the

previous order regarding child support being set aside
and did, apparently, argue about retroactivity of child
support.
Richards

In response to those arguments, Commissioner
specifically

notes

that at the time of

the

divorce, Leon earned $2,109.00 per month and that at the
time of that hearing, he earned $2,324.00 per month.

He

further notes that Janeane's Petition to Modify was based
on a change of circumstances and that Leon's obligation
to pay child support was at $75.00 per month.

Based upon

these factors, the Commissioner recommended that there
was no substantial change in circumstances and that the
Petition be dismissed.

At that point in time, Leon

voluntarily agreed to increase child support to $116.00
per month per child.
Therefore, Janeane had the opportunity on September
8, 1986; June 3, 1988 and August 8, 1988 to raise the
issue, but failed to do so.

The issue was not raised

until August 24, 1990, but clearly could and should have
been raised prior to that time.
12

"When there has been an

ad judication, it becomes res judicata as to those issues
which were either tried and determined or upon all issues
which the parties had a fair opportunity to present and
have determined in the other proceeding."

Mendenhall v.

Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah 1980).
POINT 2:

THE ENTIRE 1986 JUDGMENT WAS SET ASIDE.

Janeane admits that the order and Judgment entered
in 1986 was set aside based upon Leon's Motion to Vacate.
However, Janeane asserts the argument that only the child
custody issues were affected.
merit.

This argument is without

The Court set aside the default order entered in

1986 on the basis that notice given to Leon was improper
because the date was incorrect.
1986 Judgment and order void.

This makes the entire

The Utah Supreme Court has

held that a Judgment is void and subject to collateral
attack if a lack of jurisdiction in Court appears on the
face of the record.

Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d 602, 604

(Utah 1952) .
In the Bowen case, Appellant was improperly served
in

an

action

to quiet

title.

Service

was made

publication and by mailing a copy of the Summons.

by
The

facts showed that Plaintiff in the underlying case knew
or could have known of an address to serve Appellant
properly, but failed to do so.

Appellant moved to set

the default aside, but the lower Court dismissed the
action because the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was
13

not made within one (1) year after its entry, even though
Plaintiff knew of the Judgment within the year.

The

Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court's dismissal of the
Motion to Set Aside on the basis that a default Judgment
was subject to collateral attack at any time when that
Judgment is void because the Court lacked jurisdiction
over the matter.
In

the

case

at

bar,

the

Court

also

lacked

jurisdiction when default was entered against Leon in
1986.

In short, the entire default order was set aside.

That order cannot be partitioned to say that a portion of
it was set aside and a portion not set aside because the
entire

order

was

void

due

to

the defective

notice.

Regardless of the language of the order or the fact that
custody

was

support,
ridiculous

the

the

primary

entire

to propose

issue

order

was

as
set

opposed

to

aside.

that the Court was

child
It

is

correct

in

setting aside the default order with regard to custody
because notice was defective, but to assert that the
default order was valid with regard to child support,
even though the matter was completely resolved in the
same hearing.

The notice was defective, whether it was

dealing with child support, custody or both. As a result
of the defective notice, any order made by the Court
would be void and subject to being set aside.

14

POINT 3:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT

THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
Janeane argues that the Trial Court applied Section
78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code incorrectly in finding that
there

was

no

substantial

change

in

circumstances.

However, a review of the transcript at the hearing shows
that the Court's finding was not based solely upon this
section of the Utah Code.

Judge Taylor, in issuing his

decision, said as follows:
The
case,
while
complex
and
convoluted and having gone through a
lot of problems, from the stand
point of the law, I think is fairly
clear.
On the child support
modification, whether we consider
the increase in his salary as being
the determinative factor o_r whether
we consider the support guidelines
themselves to be the factor in
either one of those analysis, the
change is something less than 20%,
which would not justify a finding of
a substantial change in circumstance
which would vest in the Court
jurisdiction to make modifications.
For that reason, the Court, in
finding this is not a substantial
change,
denies
the
Petition.
(Emphasis added).
T., page 37 and
38.
The Court

then clearly

change in circumstances

considered

from two

a

substantial

(2) points of view.

First of all, it did consider whether there was a 25%
difference

between

what

Leon

was

paying

under

the

guidelines as opposed to what he should be paying under
the current guidelines based on Section 78-45-7.2 of the
15

Utah Code.

However, it is also clear that the Court

looked at a substantial change based solely on Leon's
actual

change

in

income

over

time

and

found

that

regardless of which way you look at it, his income did
not substantially change sufficient enough to change the
amount of child support.

Janeane's argument, therefore,

must fail because the Court's findings are sufficient to
show

that

there

was

no

substantial

change

in

circumstances even if Section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code
is not considered.
POINT 4;

APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON

APPEAL.
Pursuant to U.C.A. 73-27-56, in any civil action the
court

shall

award

reasonable

attorney's

fees

to

a

prevailing party if the court determines that the action
or defense was without merit and not brought or asserted
in good faith.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule

33 further states "if the court determines that a motion
made

or

appeal

taken

under

these

rules

is

either

frivolous or for delay, it shall award

just damages,

which

costs

may

include

single

or

double

and/or

reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
A frivolous appeal is one not grounded in fact or
warranted

by existing law, or not based on a good faith

argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law.
Rules App. Pro. Rule 33.

U.

Appellant's argument is not

16

well founded.

The entire matter has been ruled on two

occasions to be barred by res judicata.
no inappropriate application of law.

There has been

The child support

portion of the order entered in 1986 was set aside just
as all other portions of that order must be set aside as
a result of the notice of hearing being defective.
This appeal is neither grounded in fact or warranted
by existing law. As a result, appellee should be awarded
his attorney fees and costs of appeal.
CONCLUSION
Janeane's argument must fail for three (3) reasons.
First, the Court has held that her claim regarding child
support was barred on the basis of res judicata.

Claim

preclusion provides that you cannot relitigate a claim
that has previously been litigated or which should have
and could have been litigated but was not.

Janeane had

at least three (3) opportunities to litigate the issues
presented in her appeal prior to the hearing in front of
Judge Taylor.

She failed to do so at that time and she

should not be able to relitigate the matter at this time.
Second, the entire default Judgment was previously
set aside.

The Judgment and order entered by Judge

Wahlquist in 1986 was void because the notice given to
Leon

of

the hearing

was

fatally defective.

Once a

Judgment is set aside, the entire Judgment is set aside.
The notice cannot be defective for one purpose, i.e.,
17

child custody and not be defective for another purpose,
i.e., child support.

If Leon did not have proper notice,

then he did not have proper notice. The Judgment is void
in its entirety and, in its entirety, is set aside.
Finally,

the

Court

found

that

there

was

no

substantial change in circumstances, but did not base
this findings exclusively upon the statute referred to by
Janeane.

The Court was very careful and very clear

against finding that it considered both the change in
Leon's actual income and the change in the guidelines in
determining

that

there was

no

substantial

change

in

circumstances .
Based upon the above and

foregoing

reasons, the

Trial Court's decision should be affirmed.
DATED this

7

day of February, 1993.
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four

(4) true and correct

copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent
were posted in the mail and addressed to Attorney John M.
Bybee, attorney for Appellant, at 795 24th Street, Ogden,
Utah

84401 on this

1993

y —
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APPENDIX A

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
RICHARD G. HAMP #4043
Attorney for Petitioner
385 - 24th Street, #522
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 394-9431
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER,
Petitioner,
v.

,1
1

JUDGMENT IN PETITION FOR
AWARD OF CUSTODY UNDER
UCCJA

,1

Civil No. 96098

LEON VERL DELKER,
Resondent.

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on
the 8th day of September, 1986, before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, Judge of the above-entitled Court*

The Petitioner

was personally present before the Court and represented by her
attorney of record, Richard G. Hamp of Utah Legal Services,
Inc.

The Respondent was neither personally present before the

Court nor represented by counsel; however, a return of Personal
Service being on file with the Court, Respondent's default was
entered.

The Petitioner was sworn and testified, the Court

being fully advised herein, and having previously entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED, that Petitioner, JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER, be and hereby

COPY

DeiKer v. U^A.^*.
Judgment and Decree of Divorce
Civil No. 96098

is awarded custody of the minor children, to-wit:

Christopher

Eric Delker, Nichole Joy Delker, and Jacob Lee Delker, of this
marriage with reasonable rights of visitation in the Respondent, LEON VERL DELKER.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that $116
per month per child paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner
and for child support.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE that if
the Respondent falls thirty or more days in arrears on his
child support obligation, petitioner be and hereby is entitled
to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 78-45D-1 et. seq. (1985).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Respondent be and hereby is required to maintain health and
dental insurance for the minor children of the parties if it is
available through his place of employment.

Further, Respondent

is required to name said children as beneficiaries on his
policy of life and accident insurance.

In the event the

Respondent's insurance does not fully cover the medical and
dental expenses incurred for the minor children, then the
Respondent is required to pay at least one half of all medical

2

DeiKer v. ucx^^a.
Judgment and Decree of Divorce
Civil No, 96098

and dental expenses not covered by said insurance.
DATED this

day of

__, 1986

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
ELLA VAN BERKOM
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
Date Entered:

o «*o5
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PETE N. VLAHOS, 113 3 3 7
VLAHOS & SHARP
.Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2 4 47 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone; 621-7464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMENDED ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE JUDGMENT AND
INTERIM PRE-TRIAL
RECOMMENDED ORDER

JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER,
Plaintiff,
vs .
LEON VERL DELKER,

96098

NO:

Defendant.
T'r « ma + f " y
3r:l

day

LC

Richards,

having come on regularly for hearing . .,) Mi-;

,UHL f

>n •

Commissioner

sitting within

o5

'^fore

the

Honorable

the

DOEWVI J

Maurice

l*^1aTions

i in. , on the Defendant's Moticn to * aeate

findings of fact, conclusion; <o

'cw ind "judgment in peti-

t: -11 for ?ward of custody on Lojfendant " i ' K*L±I
to Mod lis
ana with

tli' JiklgM'i't", dif Plaintiff
IK-i attorney,

Pi< lui

l

n < , i I,M h ^ n

A. riummel, the

m jde to

Defendant receiving effective not I

^r>rwR

ON

DEFENDANT'S

1 Petition

appearing

ab[.e«inif>i it person and with his attorney, Pet
representations

Court

the

ji. person
Defendant
N.

T

l<tho, ,

court

concerning

tr±al,

and

the

LieiKei.

vs.

J^WJ-^W-

Civil No: 960.98

«• c)ur i- havinq
summer,
minor

11ea rd arguITIent dealing with visitation for the

verification

child,

and

> •!

the

mattei s pertaining

to

the

court

decree
being

end/or

fully

therein, enters

mended Order n.n Defendard " ,, Mutjon

cognizant

the
r

IN

custody

nf

following

lcaN

of

the
all

Recom-

the Judgment it

Petit ion for Award of Custody and the Interim PretiiaL ' n/dti
is sc t toi t.ij a:-: fol lows :
THE COURT RECOMMENnn AS i<uhhMW,-'1. .

That

the hearing

the Plaintiff's

notice

to detejinine lusiud;

n(

to the Defendant

t hi-1 minor children was

defective

in that the Notice advised the DcLendaid

court

September

<,ii

9 , 1986

and

for

the

matter

was

t . i^ in
heard

un

September 8, 19 86.
2.

That the Defendant shall be allowed to [ J it u| Hit

children
Minot,
shall
attend

i n

North

nnn

19H8 it

r

Dakota , provided

;0f- ;. .m
ln*wtv» i

return Hie children back b; Ju.uy
the riaini > i '.

fn lake

.vr k i n r

M

them back to

' "In

Defendant

/ so the cJiildren may

t ,d 'he

Defendant

may

then

pick up the cliildren on July 9, 1988 and retain tHan D ick to
Min^t,

North Dakota

for

the balance

of

his

numinei

visita-

tion .
That
prefiJnl

the

Mil Hicjiud

matter

shall

be

set

", 1988 at 11:00 a.m.

AMENDED ORDER UN DEFENDANT'S

one

]mni

MiiMiei

Delker vs. Delker

4,

ill'.1 b^f endanf

Tlint

i ;• entitled

study conducted in his home in
i

| cy/^hol <""iQi ci J

MLHUL,

evaluation,

to hav>

Nortn u d k o u ,

provided

however,

shal ] be 1 i.'Sp* ;ns J h 1«• in it IH.1 ly \ i^r

Defendant

a

H M

home
iii'ni

rliac

the

Hie expenses

and who pays the final Lull will be an jssut> at tin t inu nt
trLa I .
r

That both parties and th».- inidien ,*halJ m* ^ > > a t t,

>.

in an" psychological
MOitti

L)dk'»t

i).

t

'

< tic

*0(itp

ilaintifi

'IIMI

t'onjii1 itraii^n

I"

evaluation and/or home study, either in

wiih

Of

IlLdh.

^hal L be entitled

I

the children at ail reasonable times at

Defendant's residence

|1

> N< ill, hdLntu,

'I hat all other matters not resolved
« Sao

|

''-lei l^iij

herein shall

« he pretrial scheduled for August «: , 1*588 and

|,(> , j^ir, , •

the children die to be present <>n t lid ou,.
hi,

i'tiat

visitation

the

thji

child

Defendant

support

during

the

two-month

has the children shall be abated

^..?f/'1

in total.
DATED this

- l ^ ^ d a y of July, 1988.

/S/MAURICE RICHARDS
HONORABLE MAURICE RICHARDS
Domestic Relations
Commissi oner
Apr- 'T'r'

AtrZ^,'

•

' FORM:

-7
<>{- ^

RICHARD A. HUMMfiL
Attorney fox Defendant
TNhyr^Mn^n n u n p p

OM

DEFENDANT'S

Civil

No: 9 6 0 9 8

O R D HR

"tdie
approved

Liljn'.i
by

uh'i

I b>

1 i'l e q n i n t j

District

Amended

Court

on

[hi'*

Recommended

Order

as
d .-jy

• • I .1r - ,

<d

1QpP

5

SJWJUDGE
DISTKHCabfGiaU

'

COUNTY Ol' Wr^ER

C E R T I F I C A T E OF

IS AA ITRUE
COPY
i n ; .:,L-.i ^ i ' - . ; VY
- T i! rHAT
v \ I Ii HHIS
b 15
RUE COPY
OF 1ML GR'O.NAL OM FILE IN"jMY OFFICfc.
MAILING::
BN<5T:3 THIS . .c7. ... DAY OF LU.IQ:
!?.£{
k]C
R
Ff3D
- SRtl-NE, COUNTY CHERK 2c *
®Wt-WyO CL^^Cf;2nd Pl& f -CpURT M .

^ A , < M M M ^ . >! /?.;,
I HEREBY

CERTIFY

M),M

i Mi1"

/

day

of

July,

I mailed a true and correct copy oi the above ^n
AMENnFD

ufMTT ON DEFENDANTS

INTERIM

PRE-TRIAL

REM MMENDEI

'

1988r

*

MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
OPDEP by p bio m y

:JM&^y{^

r —'-

iq
AND

. uhe

U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the to I. low J uy ;

Richard A. Hummel
Attorney for Plaintiff
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
385 24th Street, Suite 52?
Ogden, Utah 8 4401
/

S E C R E T A R Y /

AMENDED ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S

/^

APPEND i A -::

F!! F nnpy
PETE N, VLAHOS, #33 3 7
VLAHOS f SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE
Attorney for Defendant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 8 4 401
Telephone : (801)fi? ! - A 4 >, 1

•IN

DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

THE

STATE OF UTAH
JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER, nka
JANENE BUCKLEY DALTON,

)
)
)
)

P.laintif f,
vs.

)

Defendant.

ni

H tii ddy

having

having

his

attorney,

beon

made

by

depositions

submitted

to

the

f o r p r e-1 ri a 1 o n

the Honorable

ut the Domestic Keiai. ions
in

person

and

• 1|" Defendant
Pete

attorney,

havi i lg been

i'JHH, before

appearing

Judztin Miyory i , .ind
with

come o n re guIa r1y

August,

Richards, Commissioner
Plaintiff

CfVII , NO: 9 60 98

)

This matter

the

PRE-TRIAL

)

LEON ' /ERL DELKER f

the

RECOMMENDED
ORDER

N.

Ld/:en

Court,

.-nibmi f ted

by

in

.nid

attorney
ifnf n

Affidavits

and

attorney;

in ferson

and

repi^sen La i n -n1
and

Pnf uta
and

> «nr t

her

appoirinq

V!ahos f

Plaintiff's

with

Maurice

Defendant's
ri irmq

ofhei

Plainti ff ' s counsel;

been

doruments
\ lie psycho-

logical report of the Detendant and .lu.' children lonvinc hp^n

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER

1

5'ubmi

f f ri

said

exhibits

trie

d to th^ C o u r t ,

depositions

OijuH

nt'im;

children,
lmnui

fully

having

at

the

n-quest^d

and

children

having

Mi

and

and

spoken
cogni'jviin

tJie

tf

Court

speak
having
the*

i lnji
of

ULKAW

d II le

conclusion

outside
O

the Court having accepted a l l

ot

the

with

i he

a] utei

presence

'inhvi <ua I h' (

alL

matters

l _J 11 Hv i nJ Recommended

Defendant

withdraw

hearing,
three

and
( Ji

< he

WJMI

' 'ir^"

the

parties

md

[

Conr^

O^der

he

is

I J)
and

peing

tlvrv c i 11 ,
and

die

minor

of

pertaining

Pre-Trial

to

of

aiders

set

forth

6is f o l l o w s ;
CD

FINDINGS OF FACT

o
Z 3
ULi S

;J

Si ><-• X<
br
y EC
2u z
UJ

I

'S

CO

1.

Thir

ihi MircM

(J) minor children

love both their

D

parents

and like both

the stepratner and stepinoth'-o

oi ttu-:»

N Q

18

respective parties.
t,

'I'll it: the viiiMren

d-< ii>^ 1 M v e friends

at either

place.
3.
parents

Thai

toUi

homes

and the respective

are comparable

and

that,

both

stepparent:; qt~d„ JIUITI W*-J I I with

the children.
•i .

"I'dd the P] a i i ltd ff has had the primary care of the

children trom the time of the divorce and that; tdi* Defendant
has visited regularly.

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER

2

5.

That

the

children

all

: eel

P1 a i n t i f f b u t w a n t t o

better

or:

v.*:

the

o '• • - < • . t h e

'

Defendant herein.
6.

Tl: lat all of the children agree that they like both

homes equally.
That, the

Defendant's

p a r e n t s ; or

the

children's

• .. .-.ndparenti.- , reside in lit all and |»r i niarlly i n Weber County,
8,
f: h e

That

1"he parties have agreed

De f e nda nt * s

shall

be

parent s,

entitled

to

Hie

or

the

and

stipulated

e hi1d r e n"s

Defendant ' n

that

grandp a re nt s ,

normal

i-ihructi ired

visitation as the Court applies it.
9.
Fact,

That
fhe

from

Cou r t

the

e nfer s

above
its

and

foregoing

P r e -Tr i a 1

Findings

of

r e c o mm e i I d a f i o i I s

as

follows;
PRE-TRIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
]

T ha f.th e Plain f iff s ha1 ] re ta i n the care, c u s t ody

and control of the three (3) minor children.
• 2,
two
wlv'ti

That the Defendant shad 1 1 lave rummer

(2) months

are

released

from,, school

entitled f»j pi eh up the children at 8:0u

shci

J n i tat.ir>n i >1

each y e a r , commencing' the Monday

N I M 'diii 1 ifn

fol I . 0 1 : - .

W

oh«_

d.ddren

*.

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER

are
*

released

following

aixi

i.ni. M M
from

shall

bo

in 0'iii(Li/
school

later at o:uU p.m.

and

3.
of

ThV

*rr

Per-endmt

the. c m . : L _ . .

-

shah

hn\^*

*'•/"

:

ijre: ^

ill

—iica-L r e c o r d o

as

needed.
4.

Thd

f 11 * Defendant':' p a r e n t s , or the children's

crandparentii,

Rail b ^ enfitieu

i

i ii' i'of ^ndant "

^imita-

tion rights whi^h the Court sets as follows:
i II

h

)tij»if

\ t-i(

wH>chooih

from

Friday

at

6:00 p.m.

through Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
1,1»)

E v e r y o f h e r h o I i d a y e x c I u s i v e o f C h r i s tm a s E v e a n d

Christmas

Day

turn:

custodial

parent's

ieiriaj.ii xii ~h

hero-, and r-

:

.. ,

..e ar^ndnarei.L

: -:. Cue ^nildren for o n e . a h : , i ~i

slid I 1 he. * .
the day.
(c)
on

That D e f e n d a n t ' s parents are to have the children

Father'

Plaintiff

I i;

shall

legaiidless

i ''/hose

weekend,

h a v e the children for Mother's D.

:.

1 e s s <' > f w h o s e w e e k e n d .
'"
during

That the child suppuo t: sluil he abated, hy one-half
the two (2) m o n t h s

summer

visitation that

Defendant

has the children , p r o v i d e d however; , that the Defendant
be obligated to pay the costs of Lransportation

shall

b> and from

Plaintiff"s residence in L a y t o n , Utah.
6.

Thi:ii- each

oh

t VH->

parties

their own attorney fees and c o s t s .

RECOMMENDED P R E - T R I A L ORDER

4

shall

assume

and pay

STIPULATED ORDER
1.

That Defendant and his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos,

have stipulated that the Commissioner's Findings and Recommended Order shall become the Order of the Court, and that
no trial be set in connection with this matter.
2.

That the Court on its own finds that both parties

have done an excellent job with the raising of these children and commends the parents and the respective stepparents
in their raising of the children.
DATED this

•' /

day of -Attfttstr- 1988.

3E-WCW
HONORABLE MAURICE RICHARDS
Domestic Relations
Commissioner
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

£

DITH MAYORG2
ttorney for Plaintiff

O R D E R

The above and foregoing Findings and Recommended Order
and

stipulated

by

the

parties

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER

5

to be a Final

Order,

was

signed by the above-entitled

Court on this J_

f

day

of

1988.

RONALD 0. HYDE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING

day of August,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
1988, I mailed

a true and correct copy of the above and

foregoing RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER by placing same in the
U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following:

Judith Mayorga
Attorney for Plaintiff
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
385 - 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
for purposes of ascertaining when said items were mailed to
Plaintiff's counsel.

STATE OF UTAH

I,

COUNTY Or \/EBER

j

ss:

,HERE3YC^T!PYTHATTHi5i^U|C(^
Of THE ORIGINAL ON i-lLt: ^
4 ^ W

;^(

DATED THIS
n i r u , ^
~HA^

r

,- r -

DA^OFL/.tr^lt
-/ ^Q'JNIY CLERK 2c

lS^iox\,R44n4^T/ cw

BY

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER

"* c\
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PETE N. V L A H O S , ^ 3 3 3 7
V L A H O S , SHARP & WIGHT
Attorney for D e f e n d a n t
Legal Forum Building
24^7 Kiesel A v e i j c
O g d e n , Utah
84401
Telephone:
621-2464

IN THE SECOND J U D I C I A L

DISTRICT

COURT OF WEBER

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

J A N E N E BUCKLEY
JAI1ENE BUCKLEY

D E L K E R , n/k/a
DALTON,

/
R E C O M M E N D E D PRE-TRIAL
ORDER AND R E C O M M E N D E D
ORDER ON ORDER TO
SHOW C/>USE

/

Plaintiff,
vs.

/

1 EO'i VERL PFI KER

/
Civil
/
/

Defendant.

This n a t t e r having
24th

day

of

Richards,
sitting
person

without
and with

appearing

the

to

1 9 9 0 , before

in " O T . o n

to

of

jury,

the
and

her a t t o r n e y ,

Modify

Defendant's
Order

a

the

Show

RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL
ORDER AND R E C O M M E N D E D
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE

the

and

for hearing
Honorable

on the
Maurice

Relations

Plaintiff

Court,

appearing

in

John M. By b e e , on P l a i n t i f f ' s
Decree,

and

his ^ t t o ^ n e y ,

to ''odify

Cause,

the

Domestic

Divsrce

and with

Petition

Ju d a e

come on r e g u l a r l y

Commissioner

Petition

on

August,

N L . 860995098

the

Defendant

Pete N. V l a h o s ,

the D i v o r c e

representations

Decree and or
having

been

Livii (No.:

made

ttbuyybuys

by both

the minor

c o u n s e l , and

the

child, N i c h o l e , who

Court
was

having

born

conversed

with

on April 2 4 , 1 9 7 6 ,

and the Court being fully c o g n i z a n t of all matters pertaining

therein,

Order and

enters

the

Recommended

following

Recommended

Order on Order

Pre-Trial

to Show Cause and

is

set forth as f o l 1 o w s :
R E C O M M E N D E D PRE-TRIAL
1.

That

there

That

the

is

no

ORDER

substantial

change

of

circum-

stances .
2

that the child
ner

civil

parties

support

l. o Silo.00

be

That each

increased

per month

minor children that „:il
3.

voluntarily

agreed

from

per child

to

stipulate

$75.00 per

month

for the two

(

2^

res'ioc with the Plain.tiff.

party shall

pay their own attorney

fees

and c o s t s .
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
"1.
control
2.

That the D e f e n d a n t be awarded the c a r e , custody and
of the minor
That

c h i l d , N i c h o l e , born

Plaintiff

be

granted

April

visitation

2 4 , 1976.
rights

as

previously granted to the D e f e n d a n t .
3.

That

Defendant

is

to

control of said minor children

RECOMMENDED PRE-T.^IAL
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE

have

the c a r e , custody

immediately.

and

Civi 1 No. :

4.
one

86099bUytf

That

the

(1) year

Defendant

and

at

e i t h e r of t h e m , Cun
5.
support

to

6.
child

That

the

to

7.
of

the

change of

That

Nichole,

from

residence

and

ney fees and
9.

be

the

(2)

the

child

parties,

to m o d i f y

this

obligated

to

miner

child,

agreed

to

children

month

per

child

even

or

Order.
pay

any

Nichole.

increase

residing

for

the

with

the

though

no

circumstance.
shall

to the

be

obligated

visitation

Defend -:n :. ' s

That each

not

the m i n o r

year,

voluntarily

for

back

the

for

per

Plaintiff

transportation

8.

shall

two

$116.00

have

the Court

Defendant

for

of

petition

Defendant

support

substantial

end

Plaintiff

That

Plaintiff

the

shall

with

residence

to pay the
the

to

minor
the

costs
child,

Plaintiff's

Defendant.

of the parties

shall

pay their own

attor-

costs.

That

the e x p i r a t i o n
DATED this

either

party

of one

(1) year

^^>

can

petition
if they

the

Court

prior

to

so d e s i r e .

day of S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 9 0 .

MAURICE RICHARDS
MAURICE RICHARDS,
DomeS't-'c R e l a t i o n s
A P P R O V E D AS TO

FORM:

'M. 8 Y 8 E E , 7)
Att/o ney for P l a i n t i f f
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL
ORDER AND R E C O M M E N D E D
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE

Commissioner

Civil No.:

8P0996098

O R D E R
The

above

and foregoing

Recommended

and Stipulated

Pre-Trial Order and Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause
'J\£

signed and approved by the District Court on this

day

of S e p t e m b e r , 1990.

STANTON .VI TAYLOR
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ttm

MT^YBEE,

** \i -i>ey fo

P7ainti ft
QLRTiFlCATE OF MAILING

Mailed

a copy of the above

and foregoing

to attorney

John M. R y b e e , attorney for P l a i n t i f f , at 47 North Main
_&
day of
S t r e e t , Kaysv i11e, Utah
84037 on this
S e p t e m b e r , 1990 for purposes of establishing when said Order
was mailed to Plaintiff's c o u n s e l .

Secretary

STATE OP UTAH
}
COUNTY OF WE3ER]
I Heroby Ccr'tfy
Ttat Th s 's A True Copy
Of TftG OnQn?1 Or,rt"~ .n \*u Off CQ .

RECOhflENDEO PRE-TRIAL
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE

DATED T H ' S ^ / DAYO> s ^ ^ i 9 < ^ £ ^
BENJAMIN A SIMS
'><
CLER}K^ T H E COrJrT

>ur

APPENDIX E

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
County of Weber - State of Utah

/0
IMZJL

TITLE-

fr\

Ax/

i

ksJUf

( • PARTIES PRESENT) ^

F1LENO.
'COUNSEL:

JANEANE DELKER L/

Rfin99609fi

( • COUNSEL PRESENT)

:

JOHN BYBEE IS*
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PETE N. VLAHCS, -2 23 7
VLAHOS, SHARP - WIGHT
Attorney for 3tfe%"c^rt
Legal Forun Eui]dirg
2447 Kiesel A\erue
Ccden, Utah c — 2 1
Telephone: £2.1-2-CIN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OE \<E3ER COUNTY
STATE OF ITAH
JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER,
(DALTON)

/
/

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
/

vs •
/

LEON ^ERL DELKEF,

Civil No.:

9^098

/

Defendant.
This matter having come on regularly for urial on the
14th day of February, 1991, before the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor,

one

of

-he

judges

of

the

above

entitled

Court,

sitting without a :ury, on Objection Hearing filed by the
Plaintiff at the Pre-Trial, an Objection on the Recommended
Order on Order to Show Cause, and the Plaintiff appearing in
person and with her attorney, John M. Bybee, and the Defendant

appearing

in person

and with his

attorney, Pete N.

Vlahos, and the exhibits having been offered to the Court by
the

respective

counsel,

and

the

Court

having

asked

the

parties if these were the issues and both ax:torneys having
answered

in the affirmative and the facts being basically

stipulated,

and

the

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Court

being
1

fully

cognizant

of

all

DELKER (DALTON) VS. DFLKER
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natters pertaining therein enters the following Findings cf
Fact:
1.

That Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced m

-he

State of Nortn Dakota :r 1986.
2.

Thar the Plairtiff filed a Petition to establish

child support and custody of the three miner children m

the

District Court of Weber County pursuant to an Order of the
North Dakota Court.
3.

That a hearing was scheduled

on the Plaintiff's

Petition for September 9, 1986. but in fact said hearing was
held on September
previously

found

8, 1956, and
that

there

that the Commissioner

was

inadequate

and

has

improper

notice given to the Defendant as to the date and time of the
hearing.
4.

That the Court en the September 8, 1986 hearing

which has been previously vacated by the Court granted to
the Plaintiff the custody of the three minor children and
child support at the rate of $116.00 per month per child.
5.

That

subsequent

to

said

hearing,

Motions

and

Affidavits were filed by the Defendant, along with a Memorandum to vacate the Order of September 8, and the Plaintiff
also filed Affidavits and Memorandum the same.
6.

That

in the interim

the Defendant also filed a

Petition for custody of the minor children.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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That a heari^c ras, held en

7.
Jvre

the above ~attti

en

3, 1988, arc a: said date and time, the Court r = de and

entered an Order vacating the Order of September fa, c^^ause
the Notice was defected
terporary

custody

~nd. granted

of tne children

to the Defendant the

for purposes

cf having

psychological evaluations.
8.

That said matter was re-scheduled

for August 8,

1988 at 11:00 A.M.
S.

That the Ccurt en August 8, 1988 entered a final

?re~Trial Order which

til the parties agreed to wherein the

Plaintiff was awarded :re care, custody and control of the
minor

children,

ordered

by

the

and

the

Court

support

which

had

remained
been

as

previously

established

by

the

Office of Recovery Services in which a written stipulation
signed

only

by

the

Defendant

had

been

entered

m

North

Dakota Court.
10.

That on or about March

filed a Petition
crease in child
Order entered
child

be

14, 1990, the

Plaintiff

to Modify the Decree, asking for an insupport and asking that the Child Support

in September, 1986 of $116.00 per month per

granted

and

that

the

Plaintiff

be

granted

the

judgement for the arrearages.
11.

That the Defendant filed an answer to the Petition

alleging various defenses including res judicata.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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12.

That

in

August,

-99C,

rhe

Defendant

filed

a

"ttitior to rodify the Divorce Decree for rhe mi. or child,
Nicky, born April 24, 1986 ard also filed an Affidavit in
crder

no

show

cause

for

temporary

custody

of

the

minor

cMld,
12.

That a hearing was held on all issues en August

24, 1990, and at that hearing, the Defendant was granted the
care, custody and control of Nicky to be reviewed by the
Court an a year and found no substantial change of circamsranc- tc irerease the child support.
14.

That the Defendant, by stipulation in an effort to

settle the matter, offered to increase the child support to
5116.CC per month per child for the two childrer remaining
with the Plaintiff and now seek any child support, for Nicky
which the Defendant has custody of.
15.

That

said

Order

was

entered

and

the

Plaintiff

objected.
16.

That the Court finds that there is no substantial

change of circumstance for which the Court can increase the
child support of August, 1990 to the present.
17.
per month

That the Defendant has in fact been paying $116. CO
per

child

for

the two minor

children

and

not

receiving any assistance from the Plaintiff per the agreement .
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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18.

That the Court finds that the Plaintiff's request

for the arrearage of child support from September through
and

including

matter

the

has been

present

decided

is

res

judicata

by the Court

in

that

previously

said

by

that

Order being dismissed.
19.
and

That the oldest child has a learning disability

will

be

eighteen

(18)

in

December,

and

is

only

a

sophomore.
20.

That said child may or may not complete school and

may not continue tc go to school after his 18th birthday.
21.

That the Defendant is current in his child support

on the basis of $116.00 per month per child for the two
children residing with the Plaintiff.,
22.

That

the

Court

finds

that

the

Plaintiff's

Ob-

jections are res judicata as indicated herein and no substantial change of circumstances indicated herein.
23.

That

stated

that

custody

and

the

the

Plaintiff

Defendant

control

of

by

may

Nicky,

agreement
have

the

subject

to

in

open

Court

permanent

care,

the

visitation

rights as previously ordered by the Court.
24.

That

from

the

above

and

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact, the Court arrives at the following Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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1.

That the Defendart is entitled to :.ave the perma-

re:4. .are.

n

ustcc v ~ind contrc_ c" z^e

minor child, -;icky,

subject to visitation as herein after set forth.
2.

That

the

Plaintiff's

claim

support from September 8, 1986 tc arc
is res judicata

and

for

arrearage

child

including the present

is denied; that said ratter had been

previously determined by the Court.
3.

That

circumstance

there

to

has

increase

been

no

the child

substantial

change

of

support, but that the

agraerent of th<= Defendant it August, ] 990 to pay SI 16.00
per month per child for the two children residing with the
Plaintiff shall remain in full force and effect.
4.

Ihat the Plaintiff shall have no obligation tc pay

to the Defendant support for the miner child, Nicky.
5.

That

there

has

been

no

substantial

change

of

circumstance to justify any increase nor any legal basis to
make the Child Support Order retroactive to 1986, and said
increase in child support shall only become effective with
the Court Order of August 24, 1990.
6.

That the Defendant shall continue paying support

for the oldest child until the oldest child is eighteen (18)
or graduates from high school; provided however, said child
support

shall

not

go

birthday; and provided
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

beyond

the child's

nineteenth

(19)

further, that if the oldest child
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drops out of high school, the child support shall terminate
when he reaches the E oe of eichteen (18) and shall terminate
anytime afrer he turns eighteen

(18) and terminates :: he

does net continue en 'with high school.
7.

That

each

cf

the

parties

shall

assume

and pay

their own attorney fees and costs.
8.

That the previous Order entered by the Court in

connection with the above matter concerning visitation and
abatement of child support

as filed while the Defendant's

visitctirr shall remain in full force and effect.
9.

That

the

Commissioners

Recommended

Order

and

Pre-Trial Order is approved except as modified by the Court
at this hearing.
DATED this

day of May, 1992.

STANTON; M. TAYLOR,
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JOHN M. BYBEE,
Attorney for Plaintiff

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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CE. "IFICAJT OF FILING
I

u

^reb^

^-_t^I

above c, d norac^ing

p,

*^~t a fr1 z -~a correct: cop

c~ "he

r c : ~^ v_ z u c ; and Conclusions of 1 avv

was posted JL- ~~e Umtf\
addressed to At:orne; "^c ^

F4 a^es ra.I, postaae prepaid ana
y. 3ybee, attorney for Flairt-ff,

at 795 24th Street, i- Cgden , Uta . 84401 pursuant to the
Rules of Court 4-506 by allowing three (3) days for mailing
and five (5) days prior to submission of same to the Court
for Signature

~_

~~a_-ir c same cr this

19 9 2.

Secretary
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PETE N. VLAHOS, £3 33 7
VLAKOS, SHARP & WIGHT
Attorney for Defendant.
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogderi, Utah 8 44 01
Telephone: 521-2464
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTLLLi' COURT OF WEB^R COUNTY
^T^r-" r\Y

JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER,
(DALTON)

UTA^

/
ORDER TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS

/
Plaintiff,
/

vs .
/
/

Defendant.
This natter having come en regularly for trial on the
14th day of February, 1991, before the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor,

one

of

sitting

without

the
a

judges
jury,

of

and

~he
the

above

entitled

Plaintiff

Court,

appearing

in

person and with her attorney, John M. Bybee, and the Defendant appearing

in person

and with his

attorney, Pete N.

Vlahos, and the exhibits having been

offered to the Court,

and proffers of evidence having been

made by both counsel,

and argument having been made, and the Court being apprised
that the parties basically agreed to the facts surrounding
the matter, and the Court having reviewed the documents and
the Court file having heard uhe argument of the respective
ORDER TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS
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counselors

and

having

rendered

its Findir.es

of

Fact

and

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follov;s:
1.

That the Defendant: is entitled tc have the perma-

nent care, custody and control of the minor child, Nicky,
subject to visitation as herein after set forth.
2.

That

the

Flaintiff's

claim

for

arrearage

child

support from September 3, 1986 to and including the present
is res judicata and is aenied; that said matter had been
previously determined by the Court.
3.

That

circumstance

there

has

been

no

to increase the child

substantial

change

of

support, but that the

agreement of the Defendant in August, 1990 to pay $116.00
per month per child for the two children residing with the
Plaintiff shall remain in full force and effect.
4.

That the Plaintiff shall have no obligation to pay

to the Defendant support for the minor child, Nicky.
5.

That

there

has

been

no

substantial

change

of

circumstance to justify any increase nor any legal basis to
make the Child Support Order retroactive to 1986, and said
increase in child support shall only become effective with
the Court Order of August 24, 1990.
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6.

That the defendant shal] continue paying

support

or graduates from high school; provided however, said child
support

shall

birthday;

and

not

oc beyond

provided

the

child's

further, that

nineteenth

(19)

if the oldest child

drops out of high school, the child support shall terminate
when he reaches the age of eighteen (18) and shall terminate
anytime after he turns eighteen

(18) and terminates if he

does not continue on with high school.
7.

That

each

of

one

parties

shall

assume

arc

pay

their own attorney fees and costs.
8.

That the previous Order entered by the Court in

connection with the above matter concerning visitation and
abatement of child support as filed while the Defendant's
visitation shall remain in full force and effect.
9.

That

the

Commissioner's

Recomimended

Order

and

Pre-Trial Order is approved except as modified by the Court
at this hearing.
DATED this

day of May, 1992.

STANTON, M. TAYLOR,
District Court Judge

ORDER TO MODIFY
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APPROVED AS TO FORK:

JOHN M. 3YBEE,
Attornev for Plaint:
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and
Subsequent
postage

Orders

prepaid

was

and

posted

in the

addressed

United

to Attorney

States

mail,

John A. Bybee,

attorney- for Plaintiff, an 7 95 24th Street, it Ogden, Utah
R4401 pursuant to the Rules of Court 4-506 by allowing three
(3) days for mailing and five '5} days prior to submission
of same to the Court for signature by mailing same on this
f

tf

day of May, 19 92 .

a-Secretary

ORDER TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS

TRANSCRIPT

1

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY

3

STATE OF UTAH

4
JANEANE B. DELKER,
5
Plaintiff,

6

]
i
)

7

VS.

8

LEON V. DELKER,

CASE NO. 860996098
OGDEN, UTAH
FEBRUARY 14, 1992

9
10

Defendant.

11
HEARING

12
13

HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, PRESIDING
14
15
16

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MR. JOHN M. BYBEE
Attorney at Law
795 24th Street
Ogden, Utah
84401

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

MR. PETE N. VLAHOS
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

2

THE COURT:
versus Delker.

Okay.

This is Dalton

Is the petitioner prespared to

proceed?
MR. BYBEE:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Vlahos, is the

defendant prepared to proceed?
MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
You may proceed.

MR. VLAHOS:
brief opening statement.

Your Honor, I do have a

If counsel does, too,

that's fine.
MR. BYBEE:

Yes.

I -- I have an

opening statement, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BYBEE:

This is a -- for

clarification, there's been a lot of proceedings in
this case -- this is a petition by the —

or, yeah,

by the plaintiff for modification of the child
support award.
At approximately the same time -- or a little
after we filed the Petition to Modify Child Support,
defendant filed a Petition for Modification of Child
Custody for one of the children.
At an Order to Show Cause that was held at the
same time as the pretrial, the Commissioner

3

recommended that the custody of that particular child
be changed.

And although we filed an objection to

that recommendation, we are not pursuing that.

We

are not pursuing the custody issue at this time.

We

have no problems with leaving the one child that is
with the defendant; and the other two children are
with the plaintiff.
So what we're here on then is just purely the
child support modification.

Now, I went through

the -- the file this morning and made copies of
pertinent items that I need to bring to the Court's
attention.

They've been marked as exhibits, but

they're all copies out of the court file.

And I did

that because there's so much in the file.

I wanted

to clarify it for Court and counsel.
Exhibit Number Two -- I'll go through these in
order.

Exhibit Number Two —

chronologically.

and I'll try and do it

So chronologically, Exhibit Number

Two and Exhibit Number One, and then Three, Four and
Five.
Exhibit Number Two is a copy of the Order in
the file from North Dakota saying that North Dakota
did not have custody -- or jurisdiction of the
custody matter between these two parties and it
should be heard in Utah.

~

r»W^-*^-T^

r*

C*

O
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Again, a little more background.
parties —

These

he was living in North Dakota, she was

living in Utah at the time of the divorce.
had filed actions.

They both

And so that was the reason for

that particular Order.
The next thing is Number One is a Stipulation
and Agreement signed by Mr. Delker -- who was the
plaintiff in North Dakota -- and not signed by Mrs.
Delker.

This comes in July of '86.
And the reason that I made a copy of this for

the Court is down second paragraph from the bottom it
talks about $75 per month per child in child support,
and refers to a Utah Order.

That particular Utah

Order was a order made by Recovery Services
administratively in 1981 when these parties first
separated that he was to pay $75 per month per child.
Okay.

Next one, Number Three, this is dated,

signed October of 1986, wherein it sets child support
at $116 per month per child.

Apparently -- there was

not a copiy in the court file, and so I did not make a
copy for this morning.

Apparently, the divorce was

granted in North Dakota in the summer of '86, which
did not refer to child custody or child support or
any of those items.

And so the only matter that was

taken care of in Utah then was the child custody and

5

child support.

Okay,

That's the third item.

Number Four, as some background for Number
Four, apparently there was some misunderstandings,
miscommunications, typo errors on the hearing for
child custody.

It was set to be in Utah in September

of '86.
The defendant, Mr. Delker, filed a petition in
'88 saying:

I didn't get proper notice, and the

notice I got said September 9th.

It was actually

held on September 8th.
And there was affidavits filed back and forth
and -- and the upshot of all of that was that there
was a hearing held in June of 1988 wherein the
judge -- the Commissioner recommended that the child
custody portion of the Decree be set aside, that
visitation be ordered, that a child custody
evaluation be ordered.
Paragraph —

And if you'll look in

Paragraph Eight of that particular

Order, the only thing it says about child support is
that during the two month visitation that the
defendant had the children in North Dakota there
would be no child support.

So that's Number Four.

Then we go to Number Five which is signed in
October -- yeah, October of '88.

This was the

pretrial hearing held on August 8th, 1988, before the

6

Commissioner.

The Commissioner recommended, after

reviewing all of the custody evaluation and
affidavits and letters and everything that's in the
file, that the plaintiff continue having custody of
the children; that Mr. Delker was, of course, to have
visitation.
And, again, the only thing said about child
support is in Paragraph Number Five, that during the
two months summer visitation, the child support will
reduce by one-half.
And then the next activity in the file is when
I, on behalf of the plaintiff, filed a Petition to
Modify the Child Support.
Now, we have -- and then we -- and they filed
their Petition for Change of Custody, and then we
went to a pretrial in August of 1990 on our Petition
to Modify and their Order to Show Cause and Change of
Custody.
At that time the position was taken by counsel
for defendant and the Court that child support was at
$75 a month.

In fact, that's what he had been

paying, $75 per month per child since the divorce had
been entered.

We had asked for a modification based

upon increase in income.
The defendant's position was -- was that based

7

Counsel's position was -- and the Court agreed
with him -- that there had to be a 25 percent change
in income•

So that's the reason he recommended no

change in the child support.
Second issue is, we -- and I may be wrong.

I

mean, this is up for the Court to make a decision.
The facts are pretty well not disputed.

Mr. Delker

8

has a certain income; Mrs. Dalton now does not have
any income.

There's no dispute as to those facts,
MR. VLAHOS:

Counsel.

Oh, yeah, there is,

Go ahead.
MR. BYBEE:

Oh, okay.

Excuse me.

So a finding can be made on that issue.
The other issue is, is we would like a finding
from the Court today that the child support from 1986
through 1990 was $116 per month per child and that
we -- if there is an arrearage there that we need to
do then an Order to Show Cause for child support
arrearage for the difference between the $75 he was
paying and the 116.
So we have the two issues before the Court.
We'd like relief on both of them and we would leave
that in the discretion of the Court.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. VLAHOS:

Thank you.
If the Court pleases,

there is some very substantial differences in
connection with this matter.

Let me explain to the

Court what happened in this particular case.
There should be an affidavit in the file
signed by both my client, his attorney in
California --

T a n v i o

C h i n r f l o

C

C;

p
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MR. BYBEE:
MR. VLAHOS:

North Dakota.
—

or North Dakota,

excuse me.
THE COURT:

California was

yesterday.
MR. VLAHOS:

Yeah.

yesterday; North Dakota is today.

California was
I apologize, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

We tried a child custody

case all day yesterday and we're both a little
punchy.
MR. VLAHOS:

That's probably true,

Your Honor.
Let me tell you what happened.

There was a

hearing -- my client received a Notice for a Hearing,
I think it was September the 9th in 1986, if I'm not
mistaken.

My client had retained an attorney in

North Dakota, and my client fully intended on being
here on September the 9th.
And low and behold, the hearing was held on
September the 8th.

My client has always driven from

North Dakota here to contest this matter.

And when

he called the clerk -- or his attorney called the
clerk, whatever, they said, well, that hearing was
today, tough.

10

You know, so his attorney immediately filed -and it should be on file —

an affidavit by the

attorney, a motion, and then there was a Motion to
Vacate that entire order.
Now, during the interim, you'll -- the file
again will show there were memos filed by both
plaintiff and defendant in that particular case.

The

end result was we didn't come to a hearing on that
until 1988,

In 1988, the Commissioner found that the

man did not get proper notice, and has never -- never
had proper notice for that hearing.
Now, the Order says custody of the children,
but the Order is in regard -- I think if you'll look
at the Commissioner's notes -- and I prepared the
Order, I'll take responsibility for that -- the
Commissioner set the whole thing aside because there
was no notice.

You've got an improper notice in this

particular case.
There are affidavits in the file.

I've -- my

problem is I've got two files with me and I've got
another file that thick because at the same time
these were going on, there was also a Petition to
Modify the custody of the children, and all this was
being heard.
The end result is we had a hearing in June of

11

'88.

My client got custody of some children for a

few months.

The Court was to make a final

determination.

There was some psychological

evaluations in North Dakota; here; depositions were
taken in North Dakota, here.
Then we had a pretrial in August of 1988.

At

that time the Commissioner spoke with the children.
The children wanted to go with their dad, wanted to
spend the summer with their dad or a substantial
period of time, and wanted to stay with their mother.
At that time the Commissioner made an Order,
and that Order was that the children stay with the
mother in connection with this particular case.
Now, that Order has stayed in place until
these proceedings started, for this particular
situation.

Now, we have exhibits to show what my

client's income was at the time of divorce, wre have
exhibits to show what it was at the time of the
pretrial hearing and what it is today.
His total increase from the time of the
divorce to the present has been 12 percent.

That's

been his total increase in reference to this matter.
I think the evidence will show further that my client
is clear -- is current in all payments.
Now, if you'll look at the pretrial order

I^nriP

Shincrle*.
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entered in 1990, the Commissioner found -- found no
substantial change of circumstance.

My client agreed

voluntarily, to see if we could put the matter to
rest once and for all, that he would agree to pay the
116 forward, and he has.
So bear in mind, this man has paid faithfully
every dime he was ever ordered to pay.

Bear in mind

that he pays 116 for the two children that are with
Mrs. Delker, who's now remarried, and has not asked
for any support for the child he's had custody of the
entire time since the hearing.
Now, our position is, one, Your Honor, this is
res judicata in that when we had a hearing in 1988
after the Commissioner had set aside the prior Order
because of no proper notice.

I don't think you can

have a judgment entered where a person has not been
given adequate notice.

I think you'll find in the

file that is absolutely correct.

So the Commissioner

set that aside.
Then we had all this -- all the other matters,
and at that time, all these issues were decided.
That becomes res judicata, Your Honor.

And then,

like I said, from then -- then we move on to what's
occurred in 1990 when counsel filed his petition.
Now, I don't think you can sit back four years

13

and say , all of a sudden, ah ha, I want to go back in i
and mak e this thing retroactive, when we've been to
court a t least a half a dozen times for various
Never raised.

matters

At all times Mrs. Delker was represented by
counsel

At no time did she represent herself.

would s ubmit to this Court two things:

So I 1

One, I think

if you' 11 read the Commissioner's notes -- and if
there's a Scribners error, I think there's allowance
for it.
The Commissioner set the whole Order aside
that was entered in 1986 because there was no proper
notice.

And I don't think you can get a judgment

with no proper notice.

That's like saying, you

appear in court -- well, exactly what happened.

You

appear in court on the 9th, we get a judgment on you
on the 8th, and whether you appear on the 9th, that's
tough because it was -- a judgment was granted on the
8th.
That's exactly what happened in this case.

So

I submit, Your Honor, that the Commissioner's finding
that there was no substantial change of circumstance
is correct.

My client has been voluntarily paying

$116 per month per child and is willing to continue
doing that.

Clearly, I have —

clearly, the one

14

child wants to remain with his —

with her dad, so I

don't see that as a problem.
That's our position, Your Honor, and I have
various documents relative to that.

And I just want

the Court to be aware that this Order that was
entered in 1986, the 8th of September, there were
affidavits filed by my client, his attorney, and
motions filed by his attorney, and that's why I don't
have them, but I -- in that file, it will clearly
reflect this was not sat on two years.
immediately.

It was done

Thank you.

I can have my secretary, Your Honor, get the
other thick brown file if you want and bring it over
here, but I just didn't have enough space to bring
it.
THE COURT:

Frankly, my dear

Scarlet.
MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:

Uh?
I don't want to look at

your file
MR. VLAHOS:

Well, I mean to bring

over those documents.
THE COURT:

No, no, no.

That's

fine.
MR. VLAHOS:

T a n r i o

Chi nrrla

As a matter of fact, I

H

C
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have a copy of the Commissioner's notes in my file.
THE COURT:

Well, the Commissioner's

notes are in the Court's file and the Court has had
an opportunity to examine them.
MR. VLAHOS:

Okay

Okay.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. BYBEE:

Your Honor, may I amend

my op ening statement'p
THE COURT:

Why d on't you amend your

openi ng statement.
MR. BYBEE:

There is one additional

matter that needs to be brought up and that goes on
what Mr. Vlahos says

He says eve rything was set

aside , and obviously by the copies I've given the
Court , there is no oHther order concerning child
suppo rt.
If the Court, for instance, was to take the
posit ion that there 1had to be a 25 percent change and
that the proper order was $75 per month per child,
that doesn't go to 1986.

That goes to 1981 when that

first -- that amount was first entered.
So if the Court was to find, yeah, $75 per
month per child is the correct amount -- you know, I
find as a matter of law that through all these
documents that it wasn't 116, it was $75 per month

1

per child, then our change of circumstances doesn't

2

go back to 1986.

3

Order was first entered.

4

issue.

5

finds then --

That —

that's the other

If that's what the judge -- if the Court

6
7

It goes back to 1981 when that

THE COURT:

Now, let me ask a

question -- not to interrupt you.

8

MR. BYBEE:

Okay.

9

THE COURT:

But I'll

10
11

That's fine.
interrupt you,

I guess.
The divorce was granted in North Dakota.

12

MR. BYBEE:

Right.

13

THE COURT:

Presumedly the North

14

Dakota Decree did not make an order concerning child

15

support.

16

MR. BYBEE:

That's correct.

17

THE COURT:

The $7 5 was based upon

18

an administrative order of the Office of Recovery

19

Services, presumedly sometime after the divorce; is

20

that correct?

21

MR. BYBEE:

No, no, no.

That was

22

made in 1981, five years before the divorce.

23

MR. VLAHOS:

Well, the stipulation

24

is dated July 10th of '86 that my client signed,

25

which is in the court files in the State of North

1 /

Dakota.
MR. BYBEE:
MR. VLAHOS:

Right.
And that's the

stipulation that counsel indicated.

That's the

Order -THE COURT:

But that was based upon

the $75 ORS Order of an earlier date.
MR. BYBEE:

Right.

Right.

Right.

THE COURT:

So the divorce was

actually not granted or obtained until '86.
MR. BYBEE:

That's correct, Your

THE COURT:

Okay.

Honor.

MR. VLAHOS:

But the Stipulation,

which is part of the file, states -- and I quote -that the plaintiff should -THE COURT:
MR. VLAHOS:
MR. BYBEE:

I've read it.
Okay.
And, of course, that

Stipulation was not signed by Mrs. Delker and it was
just an exhibit.
exhibit.

I'm not even sure why it was an

It was a North Dakota document that was put

as an exhibit into a Utah case.

And I wasn't

representing Mrs. Dalton at that time so I don't know
why they put that in there since it was not signed by

1

her.

2
3

THE COURT:

Do you have a copy of

the Decree from North Dakota?

4

MR. BYBEE:

5

MR. VLAHOS:

And I didn't bring one,

MR. BYBEE:

I think Mr. Dalton has a

6

Your Honor.

7
8

copy.

9
10

MR. DALTON:

Which Decree are we

looking for?

11
12

I don't.

MR. BYBEE:

From North Dakota

—

Decree of Divorce from North Dakota.

13

(Mr. Dalton tenders document to Mr. Bybee.)

14

MR. BYBEE:

Yes.

15

THE COURT:

Would you show that to

16

Mr. Vlahos?

17
18

(Tenders document to Mr. Vlahos.)
MR. VLAHOS:

of Fact --

19

MR. BYBEE:

20

MR. VLAHOS:

21

Well, this is Findings

Law.

22

And Order for Judgment.
-- and Conclusions of

I don't see that as a judgment.
THE COURT:

They may -- they may

23

delineate it differently than we do, if it says

24

Order.

25

MR. VLAHOS:

The Court -- and I

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.

can't tell you if th is is th e Divorce Decree, Your
Honor .

The only thi ng it sa ys here:

In The Matter

of the Care , Custody and Control, et cetera, subject
to jurisdiction of the State of Utah, including
visitation rights.

But I can't tell you whether this

is th e Decree because it say s Findings of Fact and
Concl usions of Law.
MR. BYBEE:

Do you have anything

else?
No.

MR. DALTON:
THE COURT:

May I see it?

MR. BYBEE:

The last -- yeah.

The

last thing it says, "Let judgment be entered

I

accor dingly it
THE COURT:
separate ju dgment.
Fact-

So there probably is a

This should be the Findings of

And this was entered sometime in '86.
MR. BYBEE:

Right.

So - - so our point is we either have $116 per
month from September of '86, or we have 75 per month
from 1981.

If the 116 is correct, then we have a

child suppc rt arrearage issue.

If the 75 is correct,

;

then the mo dification issue is not what he was
earni ng in '86, but what he was earning in '81.
So we have an either/ or type of position here.

1
T a n r i o

C h i n r f l o

f
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MR. VLAHOS:
thing.

Well, except for one

The Commissioner found that in '86 --• which

is the time of the divorce —

is when the figures

were used, whatever that may be.

You can't go beyond

the Decree.
So what you're looking at is the Commissioner
had the information before him.

Counsel wasn't there

in reference to it.
MR. BYBEE:

Right.

THE COURT:

Hold on just a second,

please, Mr. Vlahos.
MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

I apologize.

I'm taking a look at

some things in the file and I'm having difficulty
listening and reading at the same time.
MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:

Okay.
September 8th —

that's

the one you say you didn't get notice of; is that
correct, Mr. Vlahos?
MR. VLAHOS:

He never —

he got

notice, Your Honor, but for the 9th.
THE COURT:
be understandable.

The 9th.

And that would

The previous hearing was for

August 9th, and, presumedly, they made a mistake
on the -- transposing.

21

It's kind of fun to read through this file.
One of the —

well, it's nice to hear the kids saying

really nice things about everybody.

You know, they

like their parents and they like their in-laws and
their step-parents and that's -- that's wonderful.
You don't see that often.

So you're both to be

complimented in that regard.
So I understand it, it is the position of the
parties —

the petitioner feels that the $75 was

instituted in 1981 by the Administrative Order, and
then subsequently was changed by the divorce -- or
the Decree of Judge Wahlquist in '86 to 116.
MR. BYBEE:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

And then there was a

subsequent Order based upon an agreement in '90 when
there was a change of custody situation.
MR. BYBEE:

'88.

THE COURT:

'88.

MR. VLAHOS:
custody was in '90.

No.

The change of

You're right.

THE COURT:

The '88 --

That's where the 116

came up again.
MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:

Correct.
Yeah.

At that point the

judge ordered 116 for the two children and --

• •w--!^
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MR. BYBEE:

The remaining two.

THE COURT:

—

MR. BYBEE:

Right.

THE COURT:

And then your position,

and no reciprocating

support for him.
j

Mr. Vlahos, is the '86 Decree was set aside by Judge
Hyde's subsequent Order.
MR. VLAHOS:

Well, by Commissioner

Richards in reference to it because - Well, by Judge Hyde

THE COURT:

actually confirming the Order.
MR. VLAHOS:

Yes.
And the only portion of

THE COURT:

the Commissioner's recommendation tha t was objected
to was the custody issue.
MR. VLAHOS:

I think the tot^l thing

was objected to by the affidavits on file by my
client and his attorney.

Th ey prepar ed those in

North Dakota and forwarded them here, and I wasn't
involved until later
THE COURT:

But the objection was by

the petitioner based upon th e change of custody
situation.
MR. VLAHOS:

Yeah, but the total

thing is what I'm saying, Your Honor, because of no

^ ,, ~ 4 ^
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notice.
THE COURT:
Judge Wahlquist -- right.

Yeah, but the Order by
So that was set aside.

MR. VLAHOS:

I think this Court

would have to set it aside as a matter of equity when
there was improper notice to the parties.
THE COURT:

Well, I think the effect

of Judge Hyde's confirmation of the Commissioner's
Order is to set it aside.
MR. VLAHOS:

And we're willing to

pursue -- to leave it as is, with her still not
having to pay any money.

And he is current.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me -- let me

ask just for a proffer on a couple of points that may
resolve some of the issues, at least in my own mind.
Let me get the most current schedule here.
MR. VLAHOS:

If you're asking what

the current support would be, I compute it at just -THE COURT:
this kind of a computation.

Well, let's —

let's do

The -- the petitioner

apparently doesn't have an income now, is taking care
of the family.
MR. VLAHOS:

My understanding is,

Your Honor, she told my client she's going to work at
Hill Field at the Officer's Mess or the mess there.

. T —
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That's why I said, I dispute the fact she's not
working, but I think imputed income can be entered.
THE COURT:

Well, yeah, I was going

to suggest perhaps the appropriate way, even if she
wasn't working, probably would be fair to impute
income, since she's made a decision not to work, to
take care of the family.
MR. BYBEE:

We were going to show

her 1986 tax return when she did last work.
gross income for 1986 was $3,016.

And her

That was prior to

her marriage to Mr. Dalton.
THE COURT:

What —

what I would

probably -MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:

Yeah.
-- be inclined to do,

would be impute minimum wage which is -MR. BYBEE:

737 a month.

THE COURT:

Yeah, 737, 736,

something in that area.

Let's say 737.

MR. VLAHOS:

Your Honor, I've done

that and I can give the Court some figures, if the
Court wants.

I've already done it.
THE COURT:

you do that.

All right.

Why don't

Why don't you tell me the basis of your

conclusion.

-—~i~
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1

MR. VLAHOS:

2

income —

3

stub —

4

per month.

5

income --

My client's current

and that includes his most recent pay

he has an hourly rate.

It's 13.95 or 2,418

I've computed that out and his gross

6

THE COURT:

Well, let me —

hold on

7

just a second and let me -- let me do some figuring

8

quietly on my own and then we'll talk about it.

9
10

MR. VLAHOS:
month.

His gross is 2,418 a

That's on a four and a third week basis.

11

THE COURT:

12

current schedule.

13

It's not the '89 one.

14

I'm not sure I have a

What is the current schedule?

MR. BYBEE:

No, it's not.

There's

15

one in the Commissioner's office, if you'd like me t

16

get that.

17
18

MR. VLAHOS:

THE COURT:

MR. VLAHOS:

22

THE COURT:

What's the most

This one here.
I was looking at mine

yesterday, but I must have put it in the papers.

24
25

Yeah.

current one?

21

23

Is that

what you're looking for?

19
20

I have it.

MR. VLAHOS:
one.

Wdll, it's the same

I don't think it's been changed.

26

Your Honor, I 've taken his income -- like I
said, it comes out t<o 2,418, and I've taken her at
736, for a combined income of 3,154.

That relates to

7 6 percent that my client wou Id pay.

The child

support on the three children is 742, or 187.98 per
month per child.
Mrs. -- well, I don't know what her new name
is and I apologize MR. BYBEE:
MR. VLAHOS:

Dalton.
-- Delker would be

obligated to pay 24 percent o f 742, and that's $178.
And she would be pay ing 59.36 per month per child.
Since my client has -- since there are two
children living with Mrs.

—

MR. BYBEE:
MR. VLAHOS:
Dalton.

Dalton.
—

Dalton, excuse me.

My client would be o rdered to pay 187.98

twice which is 375.96, minus 59.36, which is her
portion for the one which is a net 316.60.
My client has health a nd accident insurance,
half of which is for the children.
$35 a month.

That runs about

The bottom line is 281.60 as opposed to

232.
The Commissioner ordered -- if you'll take it
on a basis of her income, I can represent to the

1

Court —

2

same thing he was right after in '86, a wage

3

grade 10 - step four, except he's now a step five.

4

and I have an exhibit.

He is exactLy the

But at the time of the divorce -- which I

5

think is the period you have to consider -- he has

6

had a gross income of 12 percent, and I've given it

7

by the year, up to and including the present.

8

will assist the Court I'd offer this --

9

THE COURT:

If it

Mr. Vlahos, please.

I'm

10

really trying to do some thinking and figuring on my

11

own.

12

I'd prefer that I be able to do that.
This is your copy, Mr. Vlahos.

13

MR. VLAHOS:

14

THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Now, let me —

let me

15

kind of go through the figures as I've -- as I've

16

perceived them.

17

be assessable under the present schedule at the

18

present time, based upon both of their incomes --

19

see, if -- see, if I'm -- we've got, basically, 736

20

or 737.

21

imputed to the petitioner.

22
23
24
25

Figuring the obligation that would

For sake of argument, Let's say 736 income

You've got 2,418 which the parties apparently
agree is his gross income per month.
MR. BYBEE:
stub, I would agree on that.

Right?

Assuming I can see a pay
Assuming that's

28

correct, there's no problem.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. VLAHOS:

He'll testify under

oath that's what it is.
THE COURT:
stub

If you have a pay

—
MR. VLAHOS:

I don't have one, Your

Honor, and he didn't bring one with him.
THE COURT:
that would be 3,155.

Anyway, the total of

If you run 3,155 for three

children, the schedule would reflect $747, right?
MR. VLAHOS:

742 was what I show,

but I could be in error.
THE COURT:
3,155.

Let me -- let's see.

My schedule, and, in fact, your schedule, I

think, would reflect 747, Mr. Vlahos.
check that.

Why don't you

That's 3,155.
MR. VLAHOS:

don't have my glasses on.

Well, I apologize,

I

Whatever the schedule

says, I have no problem with.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anyway, it's in

that area someplace.
Now, if you -- if you divide the -- in
determining what each share is then you -- you divide
the 736 by 3,155 which would give you her percentage

29

share.

As I recall, it was 23.3 percent or something

like that.

Somewhere between 23 and 24 percent.
MR. VLAHOS: I come out 24 percent.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I think if we

rounded it off correctly we'd come up with 24.

The

actual figure was 23.3 percent or something.
If you multiply those figures out then, 23
percent of 747, you come up with $174, which would be
her share.

And the balance would be $543, which

would be his share for the three children.
Is that consistent with your figures, Mr.
Vlahos?

Roughly, 174 and 543?
MR. VLAHOS:

I've got 5 63.92, but

it's so close that, you know, it's not going to vary
very much.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Now, if you

figure the -- the schedule then, the total obligation
each of them have is the 174 and the 543 for the
three children.

He has two -- or she has two of the

children and he has one of the children.

Her share

then -MR. BYBEE:

Excuse me, Your Honor.

Your figures are 174 and 543?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. BYBEE:

But that only adds up to

30
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717.

It wouldn't add up to 747.
THE COURT:

my mathematics are correct.
Well, let's look.

That's what I said, if
I wonder how I did that.

Let me run those again.

3,155

—

(Figu ring amounts.)
I take it back.

It's 573, isn't it?

MR. BYBEE:
MR. VLAHOS:

Uh uh.
Did Your Honor take 76

perce nt of 747?
THE COURT:
actually a little over 76.

Well, it's

— it's

76.3 or somethi ng like

that.
MR. VLAHOS:
didn' t —

Okay.

Fine.

I

I didn't carry it out that far.
THE COURT:

figures right on out.

Yeah.

I just ran the

So it 's 174 and 573.

Then her

share of one of the children would be the 174 divided
by th ree, right?
MR. BYBEE:

(Nods head up and down.)

THE COURT:

So her -- her

oblig ation -- child support obligation back to the
defendant would be $58 for the one child th at he has.
Then his obligation would be for the two ch ildren,
which would be two-thirds of 573, right -- or 382.
You deduct her obligation from his o bligation.

31
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Under the present schedule that wou Id be 382 minus

—

minus 58 for $324, which would be his obligation
under the present schedule.
MR. VLAHOS:

Minus the health and

accid ent insurance.
Yeah, whatever he's

THE COURT:

payin g for health and accident.
MR. VLAHOS:

And i t's roughly $35.
So we're talking

Okay.

THE COURT:

R:Lght?

just a little under $300.

MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:
exactly, if we're going to.

289, I guess.
Let's figure it

Uh huh

Thirty -five, did you

say?
MR. VLAHOS:
beyond that, Your Honor.
day.

Yes, and some odd cents

They take out 34. 67 per pay

Half of that is for him, the other half is for

the c hildren.

You've got four and a third pay days,

but it's -- you know, it's a dollar , dollar and a
half and I'd just soon round it off •
THE COURT:
289.

So that would be

Okay.

And he, under the previous Commissioner's

recommendation from '90, would be p aying at the
present time 232?
MR. VLAHOS:

Yes, Your Honor.

/-»
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he is current with those payments.
I want to give you a

MR. BYBEE:
slight correction on that.

Office of Recovery

Services show he's $66 in arrears.
THE COURT:
MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:
MR. VLAHOS:

Okay.
Well

—

Pretty close.
No.

Let me tell you

how that comes about and let 's correct it right now.
The way the government works , they're paid every two
weeks, so they divide it by 2 6 weeks -•
THE COURT:
MR. VLAHOS:

Twenty-six weeks.
And it's being reduced

each month, but the two extra pay days will catch it
up.
THE COURT:

They do that in court,

too.
MR. VLAHOS:

And I th ink you'll find

out he's current or will be current at the end of
year.
MR. BYBEE:

Okay .

THE COURT:

Okay.

You divide 57 by

the 289, come up with about something less than 20
percent.
MR. BYBEE:

What were those last

i
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figures?
THE COURT:

Well, his obligation to

her under the new support guidelines -- based upon
their incomes and deductions and additions and so
forth —

would be $289.
MR. BYBEE:

Right.

THE COURT:

There is a -- if you --

if you subtract what he's presently paying, which
is -MR. BYBEE:

Oh, which is 232.

THE COURT:

—

MR. BYBEE:

Okay.

THE COURT:

And if you figure that

232, you come up with

$57.

on a percenta ge basis, there's only -- well, it's
19.7 percent or something difference between what
he's paying, and under the new guidelines what he
would pay.
There seems to me to be two specific issues:
an arrearage issue, dependi ng on at what point we
assess the 116; and -- and whether there's a
substantial c hange of circumstance that would justify
a modification of the present support level.
MR. BYBEE:
seeking to mcidify 232.

Now, the -- we're not

We' re seeking to modify

34

whether it was 116 per child for three children, or
75 per child for three children back in August of
1990.

The 232 that he's paying now was the

Commissioner's recommendation based upon him
receiving one child and her receiving two children.
So our modification is not of the 232, it's
the 116 or 75.
THE COURT:

Well, except that the

Commissioner's Order concerning the 232 based upon
the change of circumstance, the child going to him,
would be an Order of the Court; and, therefore,
that —

that's, basically, what we would be

modifying.
If -- if we were going clear back, you know,
of course -- obviously we'd be modifying the $75, but
it sounds to me like the Commissioner's already done
that.

There was jurisdiction for that based upon the

substantial change involving the change of custody
which obviously opens up the whole thing so that we
can modify all aspects that seem to be inequitable in
view of the change.
So that the -- the -- the ongoing order -well, all right.

Does everybody agree that

essentially what has been presented to the Court
would be the evidence that was going to be presented
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by the —

by the parties?
MR. VLAHOS:

Your Honor, except

Basically, correct,

—

MR. BYBEE:

Yes.

MR. VLAHOS:

—

I do have the

exhibit that shows his income in '86, '90, and even
with his current rate, which I'm willing to give you.
And like I said, I've calculated it out -THE COURT:

Why don't you hand that

to Mr. Bybee and he'll have an opportunity to examine
it.
(Mr. Vlahos tenders document to Mr. Bybee.)
MR. VLAHOS:
THE COURT:

There's a 12 percent

—

12 percent from when to

when?
MR. VLAHOS:
present.

I -- I —

From '86 to the

in 1981, Your Honor, I don't

think my client even can recall what his income was.
THE COURT:

I don't think what

happened in '81 is probably a relevant issue anyway.
MR. VLAHOS:

And, also, I'd point

out to the Court that the Notice is improper,,
one thing, it's improper.
into court in '88.

For

For another thing, we came

The Court ruled on that.

that's res judicata at that point.

I think

1

And we all agree, that was the Order provided

2

that both parties agreed to have the pretrial order

3

be a part of the Order.

4

Order,

And it's set forth in that

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. VLAHOS:

7

THE COURT:

That was the

8

MR. BYBEE:

Custody.

9

THE COURT:

That was the $75 order.

10

MR. VLAHOS:

11

14
15

MR. DALTON:
Your Honor, in '88

'88.

That was —

—

yeah.

With all due respect,

—

and Mr. Dalton.)
THE COURT:
All right.

18
19

I know.

I know.

Let's take a five-minute recess.

MR. BYBEE:

Okay.

(WHEREUPON, at this time there's a recess,

20

after which proceedings resume in open court as

21

follows:)

22

~

(Off-the-record discussion between Mr. Bybee

16
17

or the

Everything was an issue at that point.

12
13

The '88 —

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, let me

23

preface my comments by a statement that I hope that

24

what happens here today is not going to effect the

25

sense of cooperation that I've sensed in the raising
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of your chi.ldren.

And —

and in that regard, you're

doing fine.
And I guess on behalf of society, I'd like to
i

say to you thank you because, in candor, all day
yesterday I: was faced with a situation where the
parents in the situation were not —

had not been

able to reconcile themselves to the fact that they

i

didn't like each other very much, and the impact that
that was having on the child.
Mr. Vlahos was involve d in that trial and I'm
sure that he will be inclined to agree that the child
was not in as good a position , psychologically, as
apparently your children are.

And I would like to

,

compliment you for that.
The -- the case, while complex and convoluted
and having gone through a lot of problems, from the
standpoint of the law, I thin k is —

is fairly clear.

On -- on the child support modification, whether we
consider the increase in his salary as being the
determinative factor or whether we consider the
support guidelines themselves to be the factor, in
either one of those analysis, the change is something
less than 20 percent, which would not justify a
finding of a substantial change of circumstance which
would vest in the Court juris diction to make

j
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reconcile tho se issues, if that is - - that appears to
be appropriat e.
MR. VLAHOS:

Your Honor, I think

Your Honor is aware o f how they take this out, and I
think at the end of y ear each , I think you'll find
that he is current.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

It's based on 26

pay periods, and I thlink that 's the way they work it.
And the fact he might. be, you know, 25 or 30 or $60
behind now because he. hasn't yet got that -- the
third pay check in a particul ar month, we would
consider that- to be current.
MR. BYBEE:
since August of '90.

The 116 per child was

Is that what the Court found?

THE COURT:

I think that was -- that

was the date of that Order.
MR. BYBEE:

Right.

Right.

THE COURT:

That's right.

and understand that that 116 for the two —

And I -you know,

each for two children is based upon the idea that she
isn't paying anything back tc) him.
MR. VLAHOS:
that.

Yes, we understand

We have no problem with that.
MR. BYBEE:

Right.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Right.

Okay.

